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1. Introduction 
In this book, the philosopher John Searle presents a wide-ranging and pugnacious 
critique of much of mainstream cognitive science. In particular, he argues that con- 
sciousness is the “central mental phenomenon” [p. xi], and therefore the proper object 
of cognitive science research, yet he believes that the field has either ignored conscious- 
ness or has failed to address it adequately. Searle thinks that most of the dominant 
philosophical views about the mind and about consciousness are inconsistent with sci- 
entific fact or everyday experience. 
Searle is familiar to members of the artificial intelligence community as one of 
the field’s most vocal critics, starting, at least, with [ 111, and his “Chinese Room” 
argument against he possibility of “strong AI”. While he certainly still believes that a 
mind is more than just a suitably programmed igital computer, he is committed to the 
view that mental phenomena - specifically including consciousness - can and should 
be investigated scientifically, and suggests how the investigation might proceed. Searle 
would agree that a “unified theory of cognition” is a desirable goal, and believes that 
such a theory should be based on an understanding of consciousness. In this review, I
summarize Se&e’s analysis of consciousness, his reasons for taking it to be the central 
mental phenomenon, and his proposals for its proper study. 
Searle also argues in this book that cognitive science’s focus on computational ex- 
planations of mental phenomena has two problems. First, to characterize a process 
computationally requires that the theorist reat the causally relevant aspects of the pro- 
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cess as involving syntactically structured formal symbols. But Searle doesn’t think that 
this can be done in any non-arbitrary way. The same physical process will, in general, 
admit to many syntactic characterizations, and there is, according to Searle, no prin- 
cipled way to determine which, if any, are correct. Searle concludes that computation 
does not represent a scientifically useful category. 
Searle’s other criticism of computational explanations is that a computational (or 
“functional”) characterization of mental states and processes ignores what makes them 
mental in the first place. Searle’s subsequent analysis of the ontology of mental states is 
based on their being conscious, or their being capable of causing conscious experiences. 
In this review, I do not address Searle’s arguments about the status of computational 
explanations in detail. For one thing, most of his criticisms are specifically about whether 
the brain manipulates syntactically structured entities in the way that symbolically pro- 
grammed digital computers do, and therefore whether there is an ontologically valid 
level of computation going on in the brain. He suggests that these criticisms probably 
don’t apply to connectionist approaches to cognition [pp. 246-2471. 
It seems to me that whatever the merits of Searle’s arguments about computational 
models of mind, he doesn’t appreciate the power that technical ideas from computational 
fields can bring (and have already brought) to the attempt to make some sense of 
the absurdly complex operations of the brain. Whether computation turns out to be a 
metaphor for what the brain does, or if it turns out that the brain is really a computer, 
ideas inspired by, or based on, computing technology are likely to serve until and unless 
something better comes along. 
Searle admits right up front [p. xiv], that his book is not based on the most recent 
scientific or philosophical work on the subject. Some may find his discussion of many of 
the issues nai’ve and misinformed, and the paucity of references will reinforce that im- 
pression. However Searle feels that much of the study of the mind and of consciousness 
went off on the wrong track long ago and some basic reconceptualizations are needed. 
This book is his attempt at that project. 
2. What is consciousness? 
Searle does not give a definition of the word “consciousness”. He believes that there 
are very few terms for which precise necessary and sufficient definitions can be given. 
Furthermore, to the degree that they are possible, definitions are usually embedded 
deeply within some scientific theory and represent the final states of an investigation, 
not the beginning. 
Rather than define consciousness, Searle points to examples. For example, to wake 
from a dreamless sleep is to enter a state of consciousness that lasts as long as one 
is awake; pleasure, pain, anxiety, boredom, and so forth, name aspects of conscious 
experience; psychoactive drugs affect one’s consciousness in various ways. 
For Searle, consciousness is related to or involved in many aspects of mental life. For 
example, perception involves conscious awareness of aspects of external reality. Actions 
are usually performed with some conscious intentions or purposes. Indeed consciousness 
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is involved in virtually all of the Intentional2 states like belief and desire and intention 
because, at least in their prototypical forms, such states involve an agent’s conscious 
experience. 
Consciousness is also crucially involved in what may be called “motivational” states 
like pleasure, pain, hunger, and thirst. Searle’s favorite examples of the kinds of expla- 
nations that cognitive science ought to take seriously are cases where a desire, say for a 
drink, leads to an action, to visit the refrigerator to get one. Such states are, again in the 
prototypical case, conscious, and they matter to the agent whose states they are: this is 
another way of saying that the states really are motivational. Ultimate explanations for 
much human activity appeals to such motivational states. 
According to Searle, conscious Intentional states represent their conditions of satisfac- 
tion under specific aspects. This means, roughly speaking, that of several specifications 
of the content of a state, equivalent with respect to their truth conditions, one, but not 
the rest, might correctly characterize the content of the state. Thus, when characteriz- 
ing Oedipus’ matrimonial intention, the characterization of the content as “that I marry 
Jocasta” might be accurate, while “that I marry my mother” might not be accurate- 
the two descriptions characterize two different aspects under which the conditions of 
satisfaction can be represented. Searle argues that “every intentional state has a certain 
aspectual shape, and this aspectual shape is part of its identity, part of what makes it 
the state it is” [p. 1571. 
Searle believes that there may be a large set of related things going on which together 
are named by the term “consciousness”. He is unwilling, however, to accept that there is 
nothing there. The existence of consciousness is part of everyday life; we all experience 
it most of the time we are awake. He feels that we experience, and sometimes observe, 
our own conscious states; and we infer the existence of conscious states in other people 
and in some animals. 
Here are two typical passages in which the matter is discussed: 
How would one go about refuting the view that consciousness does not exist? 
Should I pinch its adherents to remind them that they are conscious? Should I 
pinch myself and report the results in the Journal of Philosophy? [p. 81 
I am, of course, not going to demonstrate the existence of consciousness. If 
somebody is not conscious, there is no way I can demonstrate the existence of 
consciousness to him, if he is conscious, it is pretty much inconceivable that he 
could seriously doubt that he was conscious. I do not say that there are no people 
who are so muddled philosophically that they say they doubt they are conscious, 
but I do find it hard to take such statements very seriously. [p. 1061 (emphasis 
in original) 
Thus the question of the existence of consciousness is not, for Searle, a matter that 
science can raise. Science can and should, he argues, try to understand what is going on 
* I follow [ 121 in capitalizing the word “Intentional” when used to describe the general property of mental 
states that involves representation or having content. The lowercase “intention” and “intentional” will be used 
when referring to the specific mental state involving a purpose or goal or plan of action. With the book under 
review, Searle has himself given up this convention. 
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when someone experiences a conscious state. But any scientific theory that claims that 
people aren’t really conscious is false. 
To the criticism that he is defending “folk psychology” in his discussion of Intentional 
states like beliefs and desires and so forth-perhaps even including consciousness 
itself- Searle responds that the experiences of such states, and the logical relations 
among them, are not theoretical constructs, but are the data for a theory to explain: 
Beliefs and desires, unlike phlogiston and caloric fluid, were not postulated as 
part of some special theory, they are actually experienced as part of our mental 
life. Their existence is no more theory-relative than is the existence of ranch 
houses, cocktail parties, football games, interest rates, or tables and chairs. One 
can always describe one’s commonsense beliefs about such things as a “theory”, 
but the existence of the phenomena is prior to the theory. [p. 601 
Still it is worth pointing out that different individuals, and certainly different cultures, 
might conceptualize their mental experience in profoundly different ways. A culture’s 
conception of desire, to take one example, might be so intertwined with other notions, 
some physical, some mental, some social, some religious, so as to be almost com- 
pletely incommensurable with the relatively neat mental state described by Searle in 
Intentionality [ 121. For a discussion of such issues in the context of that book see [ 51. 
A somewhat related point is the possibility that the different culture may be our own, 
some decades or centuries from now, when enough of the details of the workings of the 
nervous system have been worked out for us to reconceptualize our mental experiences 
in a way that more accurately reflects their underlying scientific reality. The suggestion 
is made, for example, in [3]. Searle also hopes that such a scientific understanding 
will be reached, but feels that the result will not be to eliminate folk-psychological 
constructs, but to explain how they work. 
3. Conscious states are subjective 
An important feature of conscious states is that they have what Searle calls a “sub- 
jective” or “first person” ontology. Every conscious state is a conscious state for only 
a single person, the subject of that state. Subjectivity is a scary notion for science, 
Searle admits, because so far all scientifically valid objects, properties, and relations 
have been objective in the sense that they are all, in principle, available for inspection 
and measurement by any observer. But consciousness is not like this, and Searle thinks 
we should just learn to live with it. With planets, or subatomic particles, or ferns, all 
of the scientifically relevant facts are objective. With conscious humans and animals, 
there are what Searle calls “irreducibly subjective” facts about their conscious expe- 
riences, aspects of those experiences that are sometimes called “qualitative feels” or 
“qualia”. 
There are two important consequences of the subjectivity of conscious states. First it 
means that all conscious forms of Intentionality that give an agent information about 
the world are always “perspectival”, always from a particular point of view, that of the 
conscious agent. 
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Searle’s second consequence of the subjectivity of conscious state has to do with 
the different kinds of epistemic access a subject can have to the conscious states of 
that subject. The relationship that an animal has to its own conscious states is differ- 
ent, in principle, from the relationship anyone else can have to those same conscious 
states. Others may observe evidence of a conscious state, for example they may see 
a grimace, or they may look at the output of a set of electrodes recording from the 
animal’s brain. These would all be third person observations of the phenomenon, and, 
since Searle believes that conscious states are part of the natural biological world, 
these observations might give us a reasonably complete idea of what the subject of the 
state is experiencing. But observing evidence of a conscious state or recording prop- 
erties of that state is different from actually having the conscious experience of the 
state. 
Searle argues that subjectivity is irreducible to other, objective, phenomena, but sug- 
gests that this irreducibility might be a relatively inconsequential result of the way that 
scientific theories currently work. Searle suggests that much of science has involved 
locating a phenomenon experienced by people, for example heat, and, over a period of 
study, carving off those aspects of the phenomenon that interest us objectively, reducing 
them to other phenomena: 
Part of the point of the reductions was to carve off the subjective experiences and 
exclude them from the definition of the real phenomena, . . . But where the phe- 
nomena that interest us most are [our own] subjective experiences themselves, 
there is no way to carve anything off. Part of the point of the reduction in the 
case of heat was to distinguish between the subjective appearance on the one 
hand and the underlying physical reality on the other. . . . But we can’t make 
that sort of appearance-reality distinction for consciousness because conscious- 
ness consists in the appearances themselves. Where appearance is concerned we 
cannot make the appearance-reality distinction because the appearance is the 
reality. [pp. 121-1221 (emphasis in original) 
Searle considers this result to be a “trivial consequence of our definitional practices”, 
which has “no untoward scientific consequences whatsoever” [p. 1241. It is possible, 
he says, that a new model of reduction in science could change things, but he is not 
wasting any time waiting for it. 
4. Functionalism and consciousness 
The first two chapters of The Rediscovery of the Mind are devoted to diagnosing the 
most popular positions on the philosophy of mind, specifically with respect to the nature 
and role of consciousness. Searle believes that just about every position that has been 
offered on the subject fails to deal adequately with consciousness, either by denying its 
existence, its importance, or its true nature. 
For example behaviorism is the view that science should study only the behavior of 
the organism, and perhaps only those aspects of the internal operations of the organism 
that directly influence behavior. The flip side of this view is the idea that mental notions 
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like intelligence and belief and desire are defined in terms of how they ultimately affect 
behavior. But, for Searle, consciousness is not definable in terms of behavior. We may 
have evidence that an animal is conscious from its behavior, but behavior and conscious- 
ness are two different things. Quite complex behavior could emerge from unconscious 
mechanisms (for example, computers), and a conscious being could perform absolutely 
no actions (for example, while contemplating philosophical issues). 
Functionalism is the view that internal mental states have legitimate scientific status, 
however they do so only in terms of specific formal relations they have with other 
mental states and events. A desire, for example, is characterized in terms of its potential 
to interact with a belief to form an intention which can affect the activity of an animal 
to satisfy that desire. In some ways, Searle’s previous work in the philosophy of mind, 
Speech Acts, [ lo] and Intention&y [ 121, can be viewed as working out such formal 
and logical relations among mental states and events. However in the latter book, and in 
subsequent work he has argued that a functional analysis, however useful and correct, 
will always be incomplete, as it fails to address the relationship of these states to 
conscious experience. 
Functionalism was born with the computer and is really motivated by the idea that the 
internal states of a computer bear some relation to the internal mental states of animals. 
Computational states have the effective properties they do in virtue of their being tokens 
of formal systems, so a clear-cut hypothesis is that mental states and processes are 
like computational ones in this way. Functionalism, in its most general form, does not 
require that the brain be a computer; but a strong motivation for functionalism, and its 
most succinct example, is the operation of a digital computer. The “physical symbol 
system hypothesis” [9], is perhaps the most explicit suggestion that mental states and 
processes correspond to a specific kind of digital computation. 
Searle recounts a long tradition in the philosophy of mind, originating with Descartes, 
that puts consciousness outside the realm of science, and describes various material- 
ist theories of mind that inherit this tradition. Functionalism certainly fits comfortably 
within this tradition, however unlike other approaches (in particular behaviorism), func- 
tionalism does not deny the existence and importance of internal mental states and 
events. Those internal mental states and events are viewed as scientifically relevant. 
What functionalism does not deal with is the subjective, qualitative aspects of mental 
states. 
So the functionalist can say one of two things about consciousness: Either it just 
doesn’t exist-perhaps it is an illusion or is a part of a cultural mythology; or con- 
sciousness exists but it has no effect on the physical operation of the brain. As I have 
already shown, Searle has little time or respect for the argument that consciousness does 
not exist. 
The view that consciousness exists but has no causally effective properties is called 
epiphenomenalism. According to this position, the operation of the mind is subject to the 
laws of physics and chemistry, and involves transforming input signals to output actions. 
Conscious mental states are caused by the operation of the brain, however such states 
never have any influence on the operation of the brain (or on anything else) in virtue 
of their being conscious. A classic statement of the ephiphenomenalist position is [ 8 1. 
Searle is committed to the view that epiphenomenalism is false, that conscious mental 
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states have the causally effective properties they do in virtue of their being conscious 
mental states. 
A well-known problem for functionalist accounts is precisely the issue of the qualita- 
tive aspects of functional states. This is sometimes illustrated by the “inverted spectrum” 
experiment. Suppose we had two people whose brains were functionally identical. It 
would seem possible that when viewing a red object, one of them could be having 
the same qualitative experience as the other has when viewing a blue object. Since, by 
hypothesis, the relevant states are functionally identical, there is no way we can tell if 
this is happening or not. Indeed a hard-core functionalist might reply that the question 
makes no scientific sense, since it posits something (subjective qualitative experiences) 
which are in principle not subject to objective observation. 
Functionalism could be summed up as the view that, regarding mental states and 
processes, “implementation doesn’t matter”. What matters is the input-output response 
of the nervous system, and the internal state transitions. Searle’s response could be 
summed up: “implementation does matter”. 
Searle’s argument against functionalism can be illustrated by considering an internal 
combustion engine. Nobody would claim that a gas turbine engine and a reciprocating 
engine are equivalent because they both take in gasoline and air and generate power. They 
generate power in different ways, and the different ways that they generate power are 
important and interesting. Searle wonders if functionalism is making a similar mistake 
with respect to the mind. 
By considering only the input-output relations and the state transitions among mental 
states, and not how they are realized neurophysiologically, Searle suggests that func- 
tionalism is leaving at least two issues out: The first is that at some point we do need 
to understand how these states and transitions are realized, and it is likely that how 
they are realized has a significant effect on the other properties of mental states. The 
second is that the functionalist approach, in principle, excludes anything other than what 
influences the state transitions of the system. Since the subjective/qualitative aspects of 
mental states may be such, functionalism seems willing to give up the chance of ever 
explaining them. 
But if they don’t affect the state by state transitions of the system, why do we care 
about the subjective and qualitative aspects of mental states? There are two answers to 
this question. The first is that, whatever else it is, consciousness is just interesting. For 
Searle, it is what makes understanding the mind a compelling project. 
The second answer to the question of why we care about the subjective and qualitative 
aspects of mental states is that we shouldn’t be so quick to presume that functionalism 
is right. A commitment to functionalism predisposes us towards certain questions and 
certain answers that are consistent with functionalism whether or not they are necessarily 
entailed by it. Searle mentions the joke about the drunk who loses his keys in the bushes 
but looks for them under a streetlight because “the light is better there”, and compares 
the drunk to the functionalist who chooses to ignore certain aspects of the mind because 
they do not conform to an a priori conception of how science ought to work. 
Searle feels that it is unwise to study a phenomenon by relentlessly diverting one’s 
eyes from that very phenomenon. He believes that instead of just accepting that our 
ultimate interest is in the subjective and qualitative and therefore mental properties of 
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mental states, we have constructed an elaborate ideology to justify our not looking at 
those aspects of the states. Searle doesn’t offer any magic enlightenment that will occur 
when we take our blinders off. He does however wonder how far cognitive science can 
go if it systematically refuses to even consider what he views as its central subject 
matter. 
5. Biological naturalism 
Searle calls his position on the relation of the mind to the brain “biological naturalism” 
and characterizes it like so: 
Mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes in the brain and 
are themselves features of the brain. . . . Mental events and processes are as much 
part of our biological natural history as digestion, mitosis, meiosis, or enzyme 
secretion. [p. I] 
So the relation between the mind and the body is just ordinary physical causation - 
the neurophysiology of the brain causes the activity of the mind. Such a simple and 
straightforward view ought to merit attention for nothing else than its simplicity and 
straightforwardness. And I think that most existing research in neurobiology is consistent 
with this view. Searle’s further claim that conscious states are irreducibly subjective, 
means that scientists will have to learn how to study irreducibly subjective states. 
But in fact this goes on already. Consider research on the neurobiology of pain. 
Such research is, and has always been, especially urgent in medicine. And how is it 
pursued? Ultimately, we ask patients whether and how something hurts, and whether 
and how certain treatments reduce or change the quality of the pain. While it is logically 
possible, we really have to wonder why a distressed patient, for example, would choose 
to deceive us in a description of a pain experience. (Not that they necessarily wouldn’t - 
for example to get us to increase the dose of pain-killer.) The evidence thus obtained 
is as scientifically useful as that obtained in other ways, provided that we consider and 
control for the ways in which the evidence could be confounded. 
Imagine that we were nearing an ultimate account of the neurophysiology of pain, 
an account which would allow us to predict and describe the subjective experience of 
pain by observing neurophysiological readings. No matter how reliable and predictive 
and supported such a theory became, the ultimate test of its validity would always be 
the degree to which its predictions squared with people’s subjective reports.3 Science 
could develop theories that could describe and predict the subjective and qualitative 
aspects of conscious experience, just as it describes and predicts other phenomena. The 
only difference with conscious states is that what is being described and predicted are 
subjective experiences. 
Searle’s solution to the problem of the inverted spectrum is straightforward. Recall that 
the issue there was whether it was possible for two people to have different conscious 
3 see Dennett’s [ 6 I discussion of such a case. Dennett’s conclusion in that article is very similar to Searle’s. 
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experiences for the same color, even though all of the functional relations among their 
mental states related to color are the same. Searle’s answer is that if we understood the 
neural mechanisms underlying consciousness, we might thereby be able to work out the 
mechanisms underlying the experience of color. If we determined that two people had 
identical neural mechanisms in the parts of the brain involved in the experience of color, 
then we would thereby have evidence that the two experienced color in the same way. 
We would have just as much evidence as we would have about the similarities of any 
other causal processes in nature. To argue that we still would not know “for sure” if 
they had the same experience would either be to argue that our theory of the operations 
of the neural pathways might be wrong (which of course is a possibility), or would be 
a denial of the basic principle that mental states and processes are ultimately realized 
physically. 
Searle’s position allows a similar conclusion with respect to the question of whether 
animals have conscious experiences or not. To the degree that their nervous systems are 
similar to those of humans -specifically with respect to those aspects of the nervous 
system in which consciousness is realized-it is a reasonable hypothesis that animals 
have conscious experiences similar to those that humans have. 
Searle is willing to entertain the possibility that intelligence, and even consciousness 
might be duplicated artificially. He concedes the possibility of artificially intelligent 
behavior in a number of different writings- most famously in his “Chinese Room” 
argument [ 111 where he allows the possibility of arbitrarily intelligent behavior being 
produced by non-conscious computational mechanisms. His point in that argument was 
that the duplication of behavior and even functional states and processes is not enough 
to duplicate aspects of Intentionality that involve consciousness. 
However even consciousness might be duplicated artificially: 
Because consciousness is entirely caused by the behavior of lower-level biolog- 
ical phenomena, it would in principle be possible to produce it artificially by 
duplicating the causal powers of the brain in a laboratory situation. . . . However 
one thing we know before we even begin the investigation is that any system 
capable of causing consciousness, must be capable of duplicating the causal 
powers of the brain. If, for example, it is done with silicon chips instead of 
neurons, it must be because the chemistry of the silicon chips is capable of 
duplicating the specific causal powers of neurons to cause consciousness. It is a 
trivial logical consequence of the fact that brains cause consciousness that any 
other system capable of causing consciousness, but using completely different 
mechanisms, would have to have at least the equivalent power of brains to do it. 
[p. 921 (emphasis in original) 
The positive point here, and the reason he specifically mentions chemistry, is that the 
mechanism for duplicating consciousness must duplicate everything about the brain 
that is required for consciousness to occur. If, as Searle believes it does, the chemistry 
matters, then the artificial simulation either must use the same chemistry, or use chemical 
systems that are, in the theoretically relevant ways, equivalent. Consider for example 
how the subjective experience of pain is affected in specific ways by specific chemicals: 
morphine and aspirin, to name two. How much might the essential nature of pain be 
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tied to its relation to those chemicals. 74 The negative point Searle makes in the above 
passage is that the simulation must duplicate more than just the functionally relevant 
aspects of the brain to achieve artificial consciousness, since consciousness is more than 
functionality. 
The suggestion could be made that consciousness is an emergent property of any 
system with the proper functional relations (some of the responses to Searle’s “Chinese 
Room” argument appear to take this position). Searle points out in response that this 
suggestion is based more on an a priori commitment than on any scientific evidence. 
He argues that we observe that consciousness is a higher-level phenomenon, realized by 
and implemented in certain kinds of biochemical systems. Until and unless we have a 
theory of how it actually works, we should presume that everything about the system 
is at least potentially important, especially in the face of an alternative (functionalism) 
which waives consideration of consciousness at all. 
6. The central mental phenomenon 
One response to Searle’s position that consciousness can be the object of valid sci- 
entific study would be to happily accept it, but to then wonder why consciousness in 
particular should be singled out as “the central mental phenomenon”. There are plenty 
of other interesting mental phenomena which, at first glance, might seem independent 
of consciousness, and/or merit equal claims to being central, for example: perception, 
memory, learning, attention, making and following plans, understanding language, and 
so forth. Consciousness might be just one of many interesting things that happen in our 
heads. 
Searle’s position is straightforward: 
There is no way to study the phenomena of the mind without implicitly or 
explicitly studying consciousness. The basic reason for this is that we really 
have no notion of the mental apart from our notion of consciousness. [p. 181 
I will go through Searle’s argument for this position in detail. He begins with the 
assumption that “the mental” names a particular subject matter, an ontological category. 
There must therefore be some property or properties which characterize the mental. 
Processes which possess such properties are mental processes; those which don’t, aren’t. 
He seeks to find out what such properties are. 
Searle argues that it is crucial as we begin our investigation that we distinguish 
between “intrinsic” Intentionality and “as if” Intentionality. There are many mechanisms 
and processes that behave as if they have Intentionality, for example thermostats, and 
evolution. Such processes seem to be goal directed or purposeful or involve something 
like representations. However we know in such cases that the objects or processes are not 
really Intentional. In the thermostat, we know because we know how the thing works, 
and no Intentionality is involved-none of the causal influences in the mechanism 
4 This example is from [ 6 1 
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involve representations. And while evolution by natural selection might yield organisms 
which are more adapted to their environments, no teleology is involved. 
We are only tempted to suppose that Intentionality is involved in the thermostat’s 
operation because it behaves as if it were seeking a goal. But that’s it, says Searle: 
It is behaving as if it seeks a goal but it isn’t seeking a goal, it is just operating in 
accordance with very simple physical principles. To argue that there is no difference, 
that “as if” Intentionality is the same as “intrinsic” Intentionality is simply to accept 
either behaviorism (if you only look at the external behavior) or functionalism (if you 
check the internal state transitions also), or else to suggest perhaps that there just are 
no specifically mental phenomena at all. 
By giving it the name “intrinsic Intentionality” Searle is really just pointing to a topic, 
not making any detailed claims about it. But he is motivated by the idea that there is 
something specific that a state must have to be an actual mental state, something which 
involves more than just standing in specific causal roles to other states. The phrase 
“intrinsic Intentionality” is meant to stand for whatever that is. However the phrase does 
represent one important claim: The Intentionality is intrinsic in the way that the mass 
or charge of a body is an intrinsic property, and specifically not a property which must 
be attributed by some observer. 
Searle argues that mental phenomena, like beliefs and desires and hopes and fears, are 
intrinsically Intentional and in our quest to understand the mental, we should concern 
ourself with what it is about them that makes them intrinsically Intentional. Furthermore, 
Searle believes that intrinsically Intentional states play the causal roles that they do in 
virtue of their being intrinsically Intentional. This is a consequence of Searle’s objections 
to functionalism and epiphenomenalism, this time applied to mental phenomena in 
general, not just consciousness. 
What must a state have to be a mental state, to possess intrinsic Intentionality, and 
to have causal relations with other states in virtue of being an intrinsically Intentional 
mental state? First, conscious states are clearly mental states, and Searle’s position is that 
the causal roles played by conscious mental states depend on their being intrinsically 
Intentional. 
Next, Intentional mental states, whether conscious or unconscious, have specific as- 
pectual shapes. Recall that the term “aspectual shape” is based on Searle’s observation 
that any representational entity represents its content in a way that involves specific 
aspects of the represented object or state of affairs. Water, for example, could be rep- 
resented as “water”, or “Hz~” or “a clear liquid that fish like to swim in” and so 
forth. Representational mental states represent their contents under specific aspects, and 
Searle means the term “aspectual shape” to refer to whatever it is about the state that 
determines the aspects under which its content is represented. 
The next step of the argument is this: 
The aspectual feature cannot be exhaustively or completely characterized solely 
in terms of third-person, behavioral, or even neurophysiological predicates. [pp. 
157-1581 (emphasis in original) 
No combination of facts about behavior, combined with any combination of neurophys- 
iological facts, “constitute the fact that a person represents what he wants under one 
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aspect and not under another” lp. 1581. The mode of existence of a conscious mental 
state, and specifically its aspectual shape, necessarily involves the experience of the 
subject of the state. 
This is an ontological, not an epistemic point, according to Searle, although it has 
epistemic consequences. We may be able to discover very reliable, even lawlike reg- 
ularities among observables and Intentional properties, for example we might be able 
to develop and test theories that predict the aspectual shape that would be experienced 
by a person whose brain manifests certain measurable properties. But this prediction, 
and this understanding of the relation between the aspectual shape of a conscious 
mental state and brain properties always involves an inference on our part, and can 
never be the same as the experience of the state by the person in whose brain it 
happens. 
These considerations lead Searle to argue that if unconscious mental states really are 
Intentional states, they must therefore also have aspectual shapes. But the ontology of 
an aspectual shape involves the subjective experience of a person whose mental state 
has that aspectual shape. So how could there be unconscious mental states? Searle’s 
answer is: 
The notion of an unconscious intentional state is the notion of a state that is 
a possible conscious thought or experience. There are plenty of unconscious 
mental phenomena, but to the extent that they are genuinely intentional, they 
must in some sense preserve their aspectual shape even when unconscious, but 
the only sense that we can give to the notion that they preserve their aspectual 
shape when unconscious is that they are possible contents of consciousness. [pp. 
159- 1601 (emphasis in original) 
This, according to Searle, is why consciousness is the “central mental phenomenon”-it 
is only via its potential relation to conscious states that an Intentional mental state can 
be said to have an aspectual shape, and an aspectual shape is a constitutive feature of 
an Intentional state. 
A key step in this argument involves the claim that Intentional states, conscious or 
not, possess an aspectual shape. So far as I can tell, the argument for this position 
is based on the observation that in most proposals that involve unconscious mental 
states and processes, the unconscious phenomena are very much like those that are 
conscious- they have contents, they are logically and causally related to each other 
much like conscious mental states are -but they are not part of their subjects’ conscious 
experience. 
Searle’s argument comes down to the position that if we want the term “mental” to be 
of scientific use, there must be some principled way to decide if some brain state is or 
is not realizing some mental state. Searle’s proposal is that the ontology of mental states 
crucially involves their being conscious or their being capable of causing conscious 
states. 
It seems to me that a big objection to this proposal is that it takes one mysterious 
phenomenon, namely “the mental”, and characterizes it in terms of another, even more 
mysterious, phenomenon, namely “consciousness”. This doesn’t seem like progress. But 
Searle’s response is that the undeniable mysteriousness of consciousness doesn’t mean 
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that we can legitimately ignore it, or deny its status as the central mental phenomenon. 
Any apparent progress made by ignoring consiousness will be illusory. 
7. Developing the account 
Searle devotes the central chapters of The Rediscovery of the Mind to the development 
of a scientific account of consciousness true to his commitments to biological naturalism 
and to the idea that conscious states are irreducibly subjective. 
He begins the study of an “ontology of the mental” by suggesting that mental states 
can be understood in terms of their capacities to cause conscious experience. Thus 
an unconscious belief for example is understood as a neurophysiologically realized 
state which can, in specific cases, cause other mental states in a way similar to the 
way conscious beliefs cause other mental states, including perhaps hopes and fears, 
whose contents are related in systematic ways to the content of the unconscious belief. 
Although he doesn’t mention the possibility, this ontology of the mental could be 
extended to describe a great variety of subconscious states and events also, ones whose 
causal connections to conscious states and events are more tenuous. 
One of the uses to which he puts this analysis of mental ontology is in a discussion 
of whether and how there could be a fact of the matter with respect to “unconscious 
mental rules” of the sort posited by linguistic theory. Searle has been arguing against 
Chomsky’s “mentalist” conception of linguistic rules since the sixties. Searle claims 
that what linguists actually observe is systematic regularities in and among languages. 
When they then explain those regularities by suggesting that they are generated by 
unconscious mental rules, they must, Searle argues, show how the content of those 
rules is intrinsic. Since, as many linguists argue, the linguistic rules are in principle 
inaccessible to consciousness, by Searle’s criterion those rules are therefore not mental. 
It seems to me that two answers to Searle’s objection are possible: The first is that 
Searle doesn’t seem to appreciate the degree to which apparently quite similar formal 
systems can have extremely different properties. Consider for example the difference in 
expressive power and computational cost between a regular language and a context free 
language. Given the intimate connections between computational architectures and the 
kinds of formal systems they can implement, it is a substantive claim that the brain uses 
one rather than the other. 
A stronger answer is that Searle’s own ontology allows for a way to characterize 
the content of rules which are in principle not accessible to consciousness. This would 
involve showing how the rules are involved in the operation of other mental states 
which could sometimes be brought to consciousness. The content of the rules would 
affect the operation of those states via the content of those states, and the latter could be 
experienced. To some degree this is what linguists do already. They look at sentences and 
phrases and determine whether they feel well formed, and how they can be interpreted. 
Rules are proposed that ultimately account for such conscious judgments. 
The aim of Chapter 8 is “to explain the relationship between consciousness and 
intentionality on the one hand, and the capacities, abilities, and general know-how that 
enable our mental states on the other” [p. 1751. He refers to these “capacities, abilities 
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and general know-how” collectively as “the Background”. Searle has been developing 
this notion at least since Speech Acts [ IO], and his discussion here is relevant to 
absolutely any investigation of representation and meaning. 
The main idea of the Background is that not all of the conditions of satisfaction of an 
Intentional state are, or could be, explicitly represented in that state, or in others. Instead 
the content of a state is determined only against non-representational Background states, 
abilities, capacities, and habits. The consequences of this view are as powerful as they 
are apparently extreme. It is a bit surprising, especially if one is familiar with the “Sari” 5 
of Limited Inc 171, to find Searle writing: “Sentence meaning radically underdetermines 
the content of what is said” [p. 1811 (emphasis in original). To understand the content 
of a given mental state (or, indeed any representation at all) one must understand the 
Background against which it functions. 
My only criticism of Searle’s valuable discussion of the background is that he locates 
it entirely within the head. It seems to me reasonable that the background for much of 
our beliefs, intentions and desires is realized externally, in the society and culture in 
which we participate. This can take the form of (sometimes literally) concrete artifacts 
on which we drive or in which we live, as well as legal and institutional systems within 
which our social action is performed [ 1 1. 
8. The adaptive value of consciousness 
Searle is committed to viewing consciousness as part of the natural sciences, specif- 
tally biology. He feels that consciousness is a biological phenomenon, that it is caused 
by and intimately related to other biological phenomena. So a scientific account of 
consciousness, like other biological accounts, will have to explain both how the phe- 
nomenon works in present day animals, as well as how the capacity to experience the 
phenomenon could have evolved. 
Searle characterizes as “excessively crude Darwinism” the “implicit assumption that 
every biologically inherited trait must give some evolutionary advantage to the organ- 
ism” ]p. 106). On the other hand, consciousness is so striking and so pervasive, and 
so centrally related to the operation of the mind, that it is plausible to suppose that 
there is some evolutionary advantage to consciousness. In particular, if the capacity to 
experience subjective, qualitative conscious states required the expenditure of additional 
energy beyond what the states need to play the functional roles they do, then “zombies” 
(creatures whose behavior and functional states are identical to conscious creatures but 
which have no consciousness) would be at an adaptive advantage relative to conscious 
animals. Furthermore the view that consciousness confers no advantage on animals 
capable of possessing it begins to sound like epiphenomenalism. 
Here is most of what Searle has to say about the adaptive value of consciousness: 
, we can make a general claim about the selectional advantage of conscious- 
ness: Consciousness give us much greater powers of discrimination than uncon- 
scious mechanisms would have. [p. 1071 
s “Sari” is the nickname given to Searle 111 Denida’s deconstruction of Searle’s theory of speech acts 
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Apparently, once started, [routine activity] can run its course even in a petit 
ma1 [epileptic] seizure. But normal, human, conscious behavior has a degree 
of flexibility and creativity that is absent from the [activity during seizures]. 
Consciousness adds powers of discrimination and flexibility to even memorized 
routine activities. 
Apparently it is just a fact of biology that organisms that have consciousness 
have, in general, much greater powers of discrimination than those that do not. 
Plant tropisms, for example, which are light-sensitive, are much less capable 
of making fine discriminations and much less flexible than, for example, the 
human visual system. The hypothesis I am suggesting then is that one of the 
evolutionary advantages conferred on us by consciousness is the much greater 
flexibility, sensitivity, and creativity we derive from being conscious. [pp. 10% 
1091 
These passages suggest a number of immediate responses. First of all, there are plenty 
of “unconscious mechanisms” that are capable of making distinctions much more subtle 
than conscious humans can. Even some plant tropisms can detect water or nutrients at 
levels far below those detectable by the most talented human or animal. Also, there are 
lots of unconscious mechanisms in humans and animals, for example mechanisms of 
balance, and attention, and (one of Searle’s favorite examples) the ocular-motor reflex, 
that perform sophisticated tasks better than people can do consciously. 
With respect to the discussion of petit ma1 seizures, it is hard to know what other 
aspects of mental operation besides consciousness are impaired by such seizures, and 
whether the impairment of those other faculties is implicated in the loss of flexibility 
and creativity of behavior. And in any case, even if it turns out that only conscious- 
ness is impaired by such seizures, Searle never explains anywhere in the book how 
consciousness could influence the “flexibility and creativity” of behavior. 
Furthermore, to the degree that consciousness does confer “greater powers of discrim- 
ination”, it may indeed be a “fact of biology”, but it is a pretty interesting fact, and the 
proper subject of investigation. Biologists begin with such facts and seek to understand 
why they are as they are. 
Searle’s hypotheses about the adaptive value of consciousness seem functional. The 
adaptive value of consciousness is described in terms of the capacity to make finer and 
more sensitive discriminations, and to organize behavior more flexibly and creatively. 
There doesn’t seem to be any specific advantage claimed for having subjective, quali- 
tative, conscious states, except insofar as having those states allows for the functional 
advantages he cites. 
Searle’s response to this suggestion is: 
If we could imagine the same or similar behavior being produced by an uncon- 
scious zombie, then why did evolution produce consciousness at all? Indeed, this 
is often presented by way of suggesting that maybe consciousness does not even 
exist. [p. 1061 
To the contrary, any account that does not explain why a conscious animal is more 
evolutionarily fit compared with a zombie is deficient, on Searle’s own terms. 
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9. Conclusion 
I think that the most important contributions that Searle makes in 7%~ Rediscovery of 
the Mind are these: 
l Debunking the traditional arguments against the possibility of a scientific investi- 
gation of consciousness. Searle demonstrates that all such arguments are based on 
outdated and incorrect assumptions. Consciousness was banned from science by 
fiat, and should be readmitted forthwith. 
l Presenting cogent and valuable arguments against functionalism. However Searle’s 
arguments are not especially novel, for example see [ 21 and [ 41. 
l Beginning an analysis of the structural features of consciousness. Searle not only 
argues that consciousness ought to be studied, but begins doing some of the work. 
l Showing how aspectual shape can be used to develop an ontology of the mental. It 
may be surprising to realize, but there have been very few proposals in cognitive 
science as to what constitutes mental states, as opposed to plain physical states, 
or computational states (even, for the moment, supposing that mental states might 
also be physical and/or computational). Searle’s answer is an ontology of states 
organized around their potential to cause conscious experience. Consciousness is 
central to this account - not because consciousness has any special causal powers or 
any specific selectional advantage-but because the logical relations among mental 
states can be stated in terms of their potentiality to cause conscious experiences. 
The major weaknesses of the book are these: 
l Searle does not pay enough attention to modern cognitive science as actually 
practiced. The classic “physical symbol system” approaches to cognitive science 
that he devotes most of his attention to are in serious decline, at least compared 
with models based on distributed network models of computation, or models that 
are intended to simulated brain function directly. And of course not all cognitive 
science is involved with computational modeling, some involves observation of 
human and animal behavior, or investigation of brain function. The fact is that 
many of these latter avenues of investigation do, by necessity, make use of the 
conscious experiences of their experimental subjects. 
l Searle has a tendency to put sharp edges on the debate where consensus might 
seem desirable. That is his right, of course, but its polarizing effects could dissuade 
readers who would otherwise be receptive to his main arguments. In some cases 
the rhetoric gets a bit extreme and even self-negating. For example: 
So far no attempt at naturalizing content has produced an explanation of 
intentional content that is even remotely plausible. Consider the simplest 
sort of belief. For example, I believe that Flaubert was a better novelist than 
Balzac. Now, what would an analysis of that content, stated in terms of 
brute physical causation or Darwinian natural selection, without using any 
mental terms, look like? [p. 501 
However limited the merits of the project of naturalizing content might be, this 
example is hardly the “the simplest sort of belief” one would want to begin one’s 
analysis with. Needless to say, Searle does not provide an alternative analysis of 
this particular belief either, 
J. Batali/Artijicial Intelligence 77 (1995) 177-193 193 
The success of neither artificial intelligence nor cognitive science has been foreor- 
dained by providence. Though dramatic progress has been made, even more daunting 
problems remain. 
I think it is important that we be able to justify what we do in cognitive science, and 
how we do what we do, not only to thesis committees and funding agencies, but also to 
the wider intellectual community. Searle has taken some of the claims and justifications 
that he finds in the literature and has tried to understand them, to see if they are coherent. 
Often he thinks that the justifications don’t work. To the degree that we still believe in 
the positions whose justifications he questions, we are thereby challenged to come up 
with better arguments or to find the flaws in his. 
Searle’s critique is an interesting blend: On the one hand he urges us to return to our 
common-sense understanding of mental states and processes (hence the “rediscovery” 
in the title of his book) ; and on the other, he argues that we be more carefully scientific 
in our positions and claims. 
Searle presents us with the challenge of understanding consciousness. He also does 
us the favor of showing that many of the reasons why we think that consciousness is 
somehow mysterious or not a part of science, are mistakes. Consciousness is a mystery, 
but it is a scientific mystery, exactly of the sort that we should care about solving. 
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